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SALES ·r~).--ed- /p~.,.;,_.A c-1- 7ff/r.- _ c) - 3 J.;>.._ 1. 
J., A sells B a wagon for $450 ~ thout an:yt h1.ng being said concerning the title 
thereto. A stranger finds 'l.ihe wagon in B's possession, and asserts that it belongs 
to him. B declines to surrender the wagon, and the stranger brings an action in 
detinue for it, proves that it belongs to him, and recovers it. What claim has B, 
if any, upon A for the loss of the wagon? 
There is an implied warranty in the sale of personal property that the vender has 
power to pass a good title, soB may sue A for violation ' of the implied warranty. 
u.c.c. 2-312. . 
IJ.sK. c.f L~>>:s ~-s-Drtt~) 2. JJ6~s, a nay and grain merchant; has 50,000 pounds of hay stored in a warehouse. 
Smith agrees to buy 25,000 pounds of same at S cents per pound, and to pay for the 
same as soon as the hay is baled, , weighed and marked by Jones. Jones bale 8 and 
weighs the hay, and puts the bales aside for Smith, but before he has marked them 
the building is destroyed by fire and the contents are entirely lost. Upon whom 
does the loss fall? Why? 
Under u.c.c.2-509(3) the risk of loss does not pass to the buyer in this case 
until the buyer has received the goods from the merchant. The seller is in a better 
polJtion to protect the ~oods and to effect insurance. 
~~ses ..to, Jf.~l~:-o--3. What is the m~asure of ~amages for an unqualified annulment without reasonable 
cause by the vendee in an executory contract for the sale of an article not 
manufacture::d at the time of the breach? 
Under u.c.c. 2~701(1) and (2) the measure of damages for repudiation in this case 
would be the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender 
and the unpaid contract price less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's 
breach. But if this measure of damages is inadequate to put the seller in as good 
a position as performance would have done then the measure of damages is the profit 
(including reasonable overhead)which the seller would have made from full per-
f ance by the buyer. 
qiJ: of s.J-,._~~ ~ t'1- ~A'If-5. :fK 
flarles Harr{s- lj}Jrch!sed rrom the MaryLand Shoe Company $500 worth of shoes on 
thirty days• time. The company delivers the shoes to the carrier at Baltimore and 
consigns them to Harris at Front Royal, Virginia, the company's contract being com-
pleted when the shoes were delivered to hhe carrier at Baltimore. Harris is utter-
ly insolvent, and before the shoes arrive at Front Royal he sells them to Shuerer 
& Son for ~p400 cash. Hhen the goods arrive in Front Royal, and before they leave 
the custody of the railway company the shoe company discovers Harris' insolvency 
and attempts to exercise the right of stoppage in transitu, they having had no 
notice of the sale from Harris to Shuerer. Whose rights are superior? 
The right of stoppage in transitu is not affected by a sale of the goods by the 
buyer while in transit unless the seller consents to the sale or the buyer has 
negotiated a negotiable document of title for value, or the carrier has attorned 
to J ne sub-vendee. See u.c.c.2-705. 1 . ..J-jf_~,J. p~~ &rs: UJ.-J; 1.-~ffA tP4~ 5. Su~pose "J,n -ehe above case at the time of lfhe purchase, Harris executed and de-
livered to the shoe company his note for the $500, payable thirty days after date; 
how would this affect the situation? 
Commonly one does not take negotiable paper as payment, but only as conditional 
payment. If the maker is insolvent or becomes insolvent this is regarded as a 
violation of an implied condition and justifies the seller in exercising his rights 
of stoppage in transitu even if(it seems) he has negotiated the instrument for he 
se ll r ains l~ble as an indorser. / ~ 14-si.J< 6. On ct.8,196, Al in -the ~ ty of Richmond writes toBin Halifax county offering 
him 55 cents a pound for l, ~Oo pounds of a certain grade of tobacco,f.o.b. in 
Richmond. On Oct.9th, at 3P.H. B mails to A in Richmond his acceptance of the 
offer. At 4P.M. of the srune day B receives a telegram from A withdrawing his 
offer. Is A bound and why? 
A is bound, for an offer cannot be withdrawn after acceptance. B had accepted an 
hour before by posting a letter of acceptance. 
~-· .nzs -0 _ a+· . ~~.P-(. ·c.. t~ h,!h,.s.;l"t. 2 o (. What'is the ri~ht- g~ stOppage in transitu; who may exercise it and when? 
Under u.c.c.2~705 the seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a 
carrier or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent,(i.e. ceased to 
pay his debts in 'the normal course of business, or cannot pay his debts as they be-
come due, or in8olvent within t~e me~ning of the federal bankruptcy law). Further-
m:>re, if the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim the goods for some other 
reason(as repudiation by the buyer or refusal to make a payment due before delivery) 
seller may stop delivery of carload, truckload, planeload or larger shipments of 
express or freight. And by u.c.c. 2-702{2) where the seller discovers that the 
buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon 
demand made within ten days after receipt. If misrepresentation of solvency has 
been made to the seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day 
limitation does not apply. The right to stop delivery under U.C.C.2-705 exists 
until(a)receipt . of the goods by the buyer; or{b) acknowledgment to the buyer by any 
bailee of the goods except a carrier tha~ the bai~ee holds the goods for the buyer; 
or (c) such acknowledgment to the buyer by a carrier by reshipment or as warehouse-
man; or (d) negotiation to the buyer of any negotiable document of title covering 
the goods. . .. 
O;J:>k of )~ J. $ -- /liexJJ. fJt-- IH-c>e ss )A? ~~ S~c{. 8 .~n its grain elevator at ' Richmond the RichmondV PToduce 0o. has stored large-
quantities of wheat, assorted into separate bins according to grades. It sold to B 
at $1.75 per bushel, 1,000 bushels of No.1 grade for delivery on B's order. While 
awaiting B's order for delivery and before anything had been done towards prepara-
tion for delivery, the elevator was destroyed by fire. Whose was the loss of the 
1,000 bushels of wheat and why? .. 
The Richmond Produce Company is a merchant seller and the loss is on it. Comment 3 
to u.c.c. 2-509 reads in part/Whether the contract involves delivery at the seller's 
place of business or at the situs of the goods, a merchant seller cannot transfer 
risk of loss and it remains upon him until actual receipt by the buyer, even though 
full payment has been made and the buyer has been notified that the goods are at 
his disposal. 
''The underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant who is to make physical de-
livery at his own place continues meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected 
to insure his in~erest in them. The buyer, on the other hand, has no control of the 
goods and it is extremely unlikely that he will carry insurance on goods not yet 
• II 
· his possess~on. ,, 
~c.s - ~.s 'I . . What is the measure of damage for fa1lure to del1ver staple articles contracted 
to be sold at a certain price, at a certain time and place? 
If the buyer 11 coverstt, i.e. buys substitute articles in good faith without un-
reasonable delay, the measure of damages is the difference between _the_c_a.sL o- cover 
and the contract. price together with an incidental onaequ.en.ti-al-damage5-r but 
~~s expenses save se er s reac --u.c.c. -712. If. the buyer does not ef~eot 
cover, the measure of damages by u.c.c.2-713 is the difference between the market 
pr1ce at the time when the buyer learned of the breach an the ice-to-
u:t.__l_e.ss.-expenses sav:ecL as 
consequences of the seller's_ill!each. Market price is to be determined as of the 
place for tender in the situation presented in this questi on. 
·1~$.~ Q.. (J -r 7Tfl~ J;n r\.-,'ft-io.-~at is necessary to pas~ t i tle to personalty by gift inter viVO.s? 
V#55-43, "No gifts of any goods or chattels shall be valid unless by deed or will, 
or unless actual possession shall have come to and remai ned with the ' donee, or some 
person claiming under him. If the donor and donee reside together at the time of the 
gift, possession at the place of thei r resi dence shall not be a sufficient possess-
ion within the meaning of this section.'' Note · The deli very may be actual, con-
structive, or symbolical, depending upJn the nature of the thi ng given. 
~) LES R~1tJ: ~~ fo_ At~ tJF ·tJ,(kJ'j~ J ~ flu.!- J.#!> ~ k h fl/,. 
.i .l. William Robinson pu:rchases of David Stricfie'r 7a horse, which the latter warl-antJ ~e.. 
·0o be sound. The horse ~s delivered to Robinson, who pays Strickler the purchase 
money. Robinson soon discovers that there has been a breach of the warranty ru1d 
consults you as to his rights. State briefly what two remedies you could pursue,and 
what 1-1ould be the measure of your recovery in each. 
Under u.c.c. 2-608 the buyer may ttrevoke his acceptance" if the non-confonnity 
substantially impairs its value and his accepting the article without discovery of 
the breach of the warranty was reasonable either because of the difficulty of dis~ 
covery before acceptance or because of the seller's assurances. And under u.c.c. 
2-714(2) the buyer may keep the article and recover the difference at the time and 
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they 
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show 
p~imate damages of a different amount. 
i7k ,f- 1 () S..s. 
1. I n- case o? destruction by fire of goods which have been sold and delivered,with 
title retained until purchase price is fully paid, does the loss fall upon the buyer 
or the seller? 
On the buyer. The seller has done all that he agreed to do. The buyer has the 
entire beneficial interest and is in the best position to protect the property. 
(Tkis point is not ~overed by the U.C.C.) , , f.~ >~ e, of -r:f,J€.. - ~~;-(9......,._ _Ld'*' f{.,c:..e----13. A w~e merchant -sells fifty cases, thirty-fiVbl cases of quarts and fifteen cases 
of pints of wine of a certain brand lying in his cellar, which contains other cases 
of the same character and description. When the time arrives for the purchaser to 
receive and pay for the wine he not~_fies the merchant that he will not take and pay 
for the same. What are the different views held as to whom title passes, and what 
are the remedies of the seller? 
If the bottles be treated as fungible goods title passes when the bargain is made 
unless the intention of the parties was to the contrary. The vendee would become a 
tenant in common of the mass under u.c.c. 2-105(4). If the bottles be treated as 
unascertained goods the particular units of which are to be selected by the seller, 
title would not pass until there had been an unconditional appropriation of the 
goods to the contract with the assent of buyer. Under u.c.C.2-709 when the buyer 
fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover, together with any 
incidental damages the price(a)iHH~(b) of goods identified to the contract if the 
seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or 
the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing. Comments 
(1) and (2) read as follows:(l) Neither the passing of title to the goods nor the 
appointment of a day certain for payment is now rnaterial to a price action. (2) 
The action for the price is now generally l i mited to those cases where resale of the 
goods is impracticable except where the buyer has accept ed the goods or where they 
!:e been destroyed after r i sk of loss ha~ ~~vsed to t~e buyer. ( :i i--- r!Jf (() s. ~ ~ ~/./~ q s 6-0 1 'i ~-~ ~-~'-D-! ~ith calls up Brown by 'phone ahd offers him JSOO for his bay mare, named 
•~Pendennis,"' which sum he is to pay ·i:,hirty days after date. Smith likewise agrees 
to send for the mare tha next morning. Brown at once accepts Smith's offer, and 
about two hours later Brown's stables burn and the mare is destroyed. Whose loss, 
and why1 
The loss is on Brown for two reasons.(l) Under u.c.C.2-509(3) if the seller is a 
merchant the risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods, and if 
Brown is not a merchant on tender of delivery.(2) Smith also has the defense of the 
statute of frauds U.C.C.2-201(1) which reads--except as otherwise provided in this 
section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of ~500 or more is not en-
forceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to 
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by 
the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. 
SALES /Jttrt~ t>f· j/fk-.- 4. 
15 . What is the ~was t warranty of title to personal property:(l)where the proper-
ty is not in the possession of the seller?(2)where the property is in , ~he possession 
of the seller?(3)where the property is in the constructive possession of the seller? 
Comment 1 to U.C.C. 2-312 reads in part, "The warranty extends to a buyer whether 
or not the seller was in possession of the goods at the time the sale or contract 
to sell was made." 
.0~-K~ Df Ti~k__- io il . .1(-c.-- l~A/-,J_. . (:k .. r:-..Q - · f)/~ · )4~ > ~7 . A ~teals money and al~~' horse frdffi B a&r trahsfers bo{fi ' thel money and ·the horse 
to c, who receives both without any knowiedge of the theft, and in due course of 
business. What are C's rights against B1 
The money is negotiable, and title passes by delivery to a holder in due course as 
is the case with bearer paper. Hence C may keep the money, but not the horse,since 
A~ould not pass any better title to the horse than he himself had. 
'019-1~ t/. C- :fi 
18. What is a sale, and what a gift, p~inting out the differences between a sale and 
a~{!., and between a g~ft ~~and a g_ift causa mortift? -
e primary differences between a sale and a gift are(l)there is no consideration 
in the case of a gift(2)the subject matter of the gift must be constructively or 
actually delivered. A gift inter vivos is irrevocable.'' A gift causa mortis is made 
in anticipation of death, and should the donor recover he may regain the goods given 
away. _ t: ~rrztPJr ed_ ()}/J-1'/~ f ..., ' .e ~ · ~ sl .,__ ' ):)~~ ~.s ~~ 1 sells to B a rae~ horSe oF ~i,ooo cash.J B discovets a few days after the 
purchase of the horse that in a recent race it had been so injured as to disqualify 
it for the race-course but not for ordinary purposes, which injury was not patent 
but was known to A, who concealed it from B when selling the horse to him. What 
are B's remedies against A, and the measure of recovery according to the remedy he 
elects to adopt? 
Where goods are sold for a specific purpose known to both parties and the seller 
has reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's judgment to furnish 
suitable goods there is an implied warranty that such goods are free from known 
latent defects that would render the goods unsuitable for that purpose. Since a 
breach of this warranty goes to the essence of the contract the vendee may rescind 
the sale and get his $1,000 back or he may sue on the contract and recover the 
difference between the actual value and the value if the horse were free from the 
defect. See U.C.C.2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose. Also 
2-608 as to rescission, and 2-7~(2) as to damages. 
c . o. D F. o. /3- /5/L - f~~,(ke_ e-f 7J-t/L-Query: What effect, if any, have the following on the tim~when title passes (1) 
Sale C.O.D.(2)Sale F.O.B. vendee's station(3)Seller retains control of 'E>"L 
As to (1) and (3) in the absence of agreement to the contrary u.c.c.2-40l provides 
that title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes 
his performance with re~ence to the physieal delivery of the goods, despite any 
reservation of a security interest and even though a document of title is to be de-
livered at a different time or place. As to F.O.B. sales the same section of the 
u.c.c. provides that title passes(unless otherwise explicitly agreed)despite any 
reservation of a security interest by the btll of lading(a)if the contract requires 
or authorizes the seller to send the goods to tne buyer but does not require him to 
deliver them at destinati on, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of 
shipment, but(b) if the contract requires delivery at destination, title passes on 
tender there. 
{) /' f' .9PO Revised June 1965 · 
SALES v<,~J;-'-~ ,{-- U-uJJ. ;f,.h-,4 1 Ut._...). _ Suggested by 200 S.E.2S7 
If a conditional vendee of personalty d~~ts what remedies has the conditional 
vendor in Virginia? 
(1) He may disregard . his security and sue in personam for wha tev~r may be due ju.:: ·~ 
as if he were an unsecured creditor. 
(2) Under U.C.C.9-503 the secured party may take possession of the collateral 
without judicial process if this can be done without a breach of the peace, or, in 
lieu of self help, he can bring a possessory action. 
(3) Under u.c.C.9-504 the secured party, after default may sell or lease any or 
all of the collateral in its then condition or after any commercially reasonable 
preparation or processing. 
(4) The proceeds of a sale or lease are applied as follows: 
(a) to the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, sell-
ing, and to the extent provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the 
reasonable attorneys• fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party; 
(b) the satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by the security interest; 
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security 
interest if written demand therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds 
is completed. 
(5) In our case by U.C.C.9-504(2) the secured party must account to the debtor 
for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any de-
ficicency. 
(6) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may 
be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a 
unit or in parcels arrl at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of 
the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commer-
cially reasonable. Unle3s collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily 
in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notifiw 
cation of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the 
time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall 
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, and except in tha case of consumer goods 
to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly 
filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this State or who 
is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral. The 
secured party may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type custom-
arily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely 
distributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale. 
Sales~J.,- , ·,"'- -p ",.J Suggested by 190 S.E.257 and 178 Va.l04. If~ condl\ional vertd~~ults and the conditional vendor brings an action in 
detinue for the property, what are the rights of the parties? 
Under V#'B-593 an action iO. detinue lies. This section has not been repealed and 
now (1965) reads as follows: 1When final judgment is rendered on the trial of such 
action or warrant, the court or judge shall dispose of the property or proceeds 
according to the rights of those entitled; and when in any such action or warrant 
the plaintiff shall prevail under a contract which, regardless of its form or ex-
press terms, was in fact made to secure the payment of money to the plaintiff or 
his assignor, judgment shall be for the recovery of the amount due the plaintiff 
thereunder, or else the specific property, and costs, and the defendant shall have 
the election of paying the amount of such judgment or surrendering the specific 
property. And the court or judge may grant the defendant a reasonable time not 
exceeding thirty days, within which to discharge such judgment upon such security 
being given as the court or judge may deem sufficient. 
In the event of any inconsistency between this section and any applicable pro• 
visions of Arthcle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the p~visions of that Article 
shall control. 
- , 901 Revised June 1965. 3..4T.;~s F. 015 - -~ ~jJ~;- ~s. 177 Va.331. 
Defendant bought goods for plainti _ <.!for his hotel nr .o.b. respective far,:rtorioa.:1 
Ano ther clause in the contract provi ed that plaintiff agreed to deliver and inst2ll 
the furniture and furnishings in the hotel on or about May 25,1939. Should plai ntiff 
or defendant pay the freight? 
Held: Defendant should pay the freight. The term. nr.o .,b. respective factoriestt 
does not purport to tell when or how the goods will be delivered. Hence the o~her 
clause about delivery on or about May 25th fixing date of delivery. 
11\'Jhere there is a repugnancy(if it be admitted that tnere is one)a general provisior 
in a contract must give way to a special one covering the same ground. 11 Note: In the 
instant case defendant had at first paid all freight charges. I·Ien~e the court aJs o 
applied the following rule, ltThe well recognized rule is that if an instrument may 
have two interpretations, the courts in endeavoring to determine the intention of 
the parties will ft.llow the one which they put upon it by their own actions." 
SALES CQ~J tr2ctl'i H1.~nal wajyer . 177 Va. 716 
P ordered burlap sacks from D to be delivered before March 1939. After that date D 
wrote P that he would like shipping instructions on at least part of the sacks, and p 
gave such instructions on part of the shipment. In Sept. P asked for the rest of the 
saoka~ Because of war conditions burlap doubled in price, and D claimed the contract 
was no longer in force. Is Contract in for-ce? Held: Yes, when both parties after 
March treated it as in force ther€ was a mutual waiver of time requirements. 
Is evidence that P and D had had ot.her contracts and that in their performance time 
had ne·lfer been regarded as of the essence,adrnissible? Held: Yes, not for the purpose 
of varying the contract, bt1 t as evidence of a waiver of the time terms of the instant 
contract. If contrac~ was in force, fact that it was more difficult to perform than 
D had expected will not excuse him. 
SALES Improper disposition by conditional vendor Suggested by 178 Va.l04 
Conditional vendor, hereinafter called C, sold<a portable saw mill to B for $800. 
B paid $600 cash and eventually defaulted on the balance. C repossessed and used the 
mill as his own without bothering to hold a sale of any kind. It was soon thereafter 
injured by fire. What are the rights of the parties? 
Under the U .c .c. 9·-507 a secured party who is not followi.ng the law where there 
has been default, may be restrained on appropriate terms and conditions, and, if the 
disposition has occurred is liable in damages for any loss caused thereby--in our 
case for the reasonable value of Bfs interest in the mill just prior to the fire. 
SAlES ~J, S,4t_ j/ 
A conditional sales ctnt~t provides that if the vendee defaults, the vendor may 
repossess the goods sold and sell same, and hold the vendee for any deficiency. Is 
this provision of the contract valid? 
Under u.c.C.9-504(3) this provision is valid as long as the conditional vendor 
acts in good faith and the sale is made in a commercially-reasonable manner. 
SALES Bulk Sales Bar kiam. Dec.l943 
Q.2. A merchant in Richmond, Va. conveyed all of his st ock of" goods in 3. store to 
his wife. She thereafter reconveyed the stock of goods to her husband, the merchant. 
Both conveyances were in consideration of natural love and affection. After these 
transfers the husband became indebted to X for the purchase of additional merchandisE 
in the ordinary course of business. The husband at all times continue·d in actual 
FCssession of the stock of goods. The husband became insolvent and X instituted 
action at law against th~ wife for the amount owing. Can X recover against the wife1 
In the absence of statute there would be clearly no personal liability on the part 
of the wife for the debts of her husband. Since the~e was no consideration for the 
conveyances or change in possession, both transaction were void. Hence the situation 
is the s~e as if they had not been made, and a Bulk Sales law would not apply, 
even if there were such a statute. 
{~X Tr~"- J> f~ LMJJ s 902 revised June 1965 
Note: Article VI of the U .c.c. deals with Bulk Tra.'1sfe:rs. The central purpose of 
all bulk transfer(bulk sales) laws is to deal with two common forms of commercial 
fraud, namely:(a) The merchant, owing debts, who sells out his stock in trade to a 
friend for less than it is worth, pays his creditors loss than he owes them, and 
hopes to come back onto the business through the back door some time in the future . 
(b) The merchant, owing debts, who selJs out his stock in trade to any one for an:r 
price, pockets the proceeds, and disappears leaving his creditors m1paid. 
U .C .0.6-102 states that the enterprises subject t.o th:i s Artigle are all those 
where principal business is the sale of merchandise from stock, in~]uding those ¥ho 
manufacture what they sell. A bulk transfer is defined as any 1 tr~:msfer in bnlk ' a11d 
'' not in the ordinary course~'of the transfer:ror's business of a ''major part' of the 
>"materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory ' 'of an enterprise subjec·~ to 
this article. 
When the reason for a rule ceases, the rule its8lf ceases. Hence any bulk transfer 
that does no .end da.f~au<i-~edi~o:rs . .i · general ex~Q_£!-ed. Among · the EU:cepted 
transfers are sales by executors, assignments for the benefit of all creditors, 
transfers from one form of business organization(say a partnership) to another 
form(sny a corporation) where. public noti~e is given and the new enterprise 
assumes the debts of the old and is solvent at that time. 
Further excerpts from Article 6 are set forth below: 
#6wl04 Schedule of Property, Liet of Creditors.(l) A bulk transfer is ineffective 
against any creditor of the t:.'ansferor unll3ss: 
(a) The transf~ee requires the tranoferor to furnish a list of his existing 
cr~ditors prepared as sta.~ed in this section; and 
(b) The parties prepare a schedule of the prgp~rty transferred sufficient to 
identi:f'y it 9 and -(c) '£he transfe:::-ee reserves the list s.nd schedule for six months next following 
the transfer and permits inspection of either or both.and copying therefrom c~ any 
creditor of the transferor, or files the list and sched~1a in(a public office to be 
here identified). 
(2) The list of creditors must be signed and sworn to or a irmed bY- t rans~eror 
or hia agent. It must contain the names and business addresses of all creditors of 
the transferor, with the amounts U.7h-3n known, and aJs ~ the names of all persons who 
are known to the transeror to assert claims against him even though such claims are 
disp!J.tf!de 
(3) Responsibility :t'o~a~Gmp-let"neaa_snd._ac-,_cJll:ll.e o · h lisLQ.f__cie.diws rests 
QP the transferor., and the transfer is not rendered ineffeQt:bre by errors or 
omissions therein unless the transferee is sho~~ to have had knowledge. 
#6-105. Notice to Creditors. In addition to the requi.rements of the preceding 
section, any bulk transfer is ineffective against any creditor of the transf&·or 
unless at least ten days before he takes possession of the goods or pays for them, 
whichever happens first, the transferee give~1 notice of the transfer in the mnnner 
and to the persons hereafter provided (#6-107). 
#6-107 The Notice.(l) The notice to creditors(#6-l05) shall state: 
(a) that a bulk transfer is about to be ma.de; and 
(b) the names and business addresses of the transferor and transferee. 
#6·110 Subsequent Transfers. 1~1en the title of a transferee to property is subject 
to a defe~ by re&son of his non-complianee with the requirements of this Article, 
then: (1) a purchaser of any of suah property from such transferee who pays no value 
or who takes with notice of such noncomplience takes subject to such defect, but 
(2) a purchaser for Yalue in good faith and without such notice takes free of such 
defect. 
1/6---111. Limitation of Actions and I.evies. No aot ion under this Article shall be 
brought nor levy made more than siX months after the date on which the transferee 
took possession of the goods unless the transfer has been concealed. If the transfer 
has been concealed, actions may be brought or levies made within six months after 
its dis~overy. 
IJ. . 1 1 I 903 o Revisedltne 1965 BALES f' i S.K of 1--o~ s ·- t)-(J-H'~ ;·~ /1-.s._.s. llf t!e...--Bar E:;mm, Deo~l9h3 
Q •. 10. On Jan.20,1936, A.P. Halsworth and Co. sol to Pt:.'i-e Food Corporation 200 
tarrels each containing 100 pounds of Dixie Belle, Grade AA, Flour, at $4 per 
barrel. At 3 p~m. on that day Halsworth & Co. received Pure Food Corporation's 
chec~k in the amount of $8001 and at the ssme time delivered to Pure Food Corporat,io:cl 
a rE;Ceipt in full and an order for the 200 barrels on Carl Apperson, in whose wru:'e·~ 
house were stored 395 barrels each containing 100 lbs. of Dixie Belle, Grade AA, 
Flour owned by Halsworth & Co. At 4 P.M. on Jan. 20, before any further st.ops h:3.d 
been taken, Apperson's warehouse caught fire, and within a short time the we.r'3housa 
and its entire contents were destroyed. Halsworth & Co. contend that the loss of 
the 200 barrels must be borne by Pure Food Corporation, lvhich the latter denies. 
What is your opinion as to this? 
A. Under the u.c.c. the loss would be on Halsworth & Co. u.c.c. 2-503(4)(b) in so 
far as applicable to our problem provides that where goods(flour in our case) are 
in the possession of a bailee and ~e to be delivered(by the seller to the buyer 
without being removed by the seller) tender to the buyer of a written. direction to 
the bailee to deliver is sufficient tender, but risk of loss of the goods remalns 
on the seller until the buyer has had a rea3onable time to present the direction 
(to the bailee). 
SALES E oods 181Va.256. 
X contracted to sell Y a la.rge quam, y of flower bulbs by sample. Y accepted the 
bulbs, although he shortly thereafter chimed they were not up to sample. X claim-
ed that by accepting the"n Y waived any defect of quality. Is this contention sound? 
The ma.1ority rule is that an acceptance is not per se a waiver of inferior qualityl 
and that Y can accept and sue for breach of the warranty that the goods are like 
the sample, recovering a judgment for the difference between their actual value and 
.their value if they had been as per the sample. 
But where, as in the instant case, the gpods were open to inspection and any sub-
stantial difference was apparent, and where Y in turn attempted to sell the bulbs to 
others using the same samples he had himself received, there is enough to indicate 
a waiver of any d-"fect . in quality and the vendor is entitled to judgment for the fuJJ 
purchase price. u.c.c. 2-607 is in accord with all of the above. 
SALES, iORTS Effect of lack of privity Suggested by 181 Va.390 
P ran a boardhlg neuse and purchaseCI some ham from D. Everyone who partook of the 
ham contracted ptomaine poisoning. Assuming no other evidence, can the boarders 
recover from D? 
Since 1963 the defense of lack of privity has been practically abolished. The 
special Virginia versi on of the U.C.C. on this point now reads as follows: 
#2-318. When Lack of Privity No ·Defense in Action Against Manufacturer or Seller 
of Goods. Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in 
any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages 
for breach of warranty, express or i mplied, or for neglige1~e, although the plain-
tiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant, if the plaintiff was a person 
whom the manufacturer or seller might r easonably have expected to use, consume, or 
be affected by the goods. 
SALES Cumulatte warranti;es Suggested by 184 Va. 588. 
D sold f a f urnace made of substitute wa.r~time materials expressly warranting in 
writing that the furnace was free from defective material and workmanship. The 
furnaces, though properl:')r made, were not suitable for the purpose which the seller 
knew the buyer intended to use them. D was a dealer and not a manufacturer. Does 
the express warranty exclude the impli ed warranty of fitness? 
No, unless necessarily inconsistent, and generally not even then in the case of 
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The following excerpts 
from the u.c.c. are in pointt #2-314. Implied ~~arranty: Merchanta.bility:(l) Unless 
excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in 
a contract for their sale if the sell er is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind. 
·. 90h w Revised June 1965' 
#2·,.J1S'--Implied Warranty: Fitness f.or Particular Purpose. 
lilhare the seller at the time of co.utracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the 
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is -lP.~ an 
implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
f/2-317. Cumulation and Conflict o~ 11Tarranties Express or Impliedo 
1iJarranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent 'trith each 
other and as cumulative, but if sueh construction is unreasonable the intention of 
the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant, In ascertaining that in·-
tention the following rules apply: (c) Express warranties displace inconsistent 
implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose. 
SAJ .. ES(first case)Restaurant f~n- · f: • 0 ,..( ...., .... ~ested by 188 Va.214 
X and Y went into P' s restaurant/ aA~/ch~cfrBerecil~Y'paid for their meals. They 
were friends and sat at the same table. X did not wish his desert and gave it to y 
who ate it. Are X and Y guilty of a tort? 
Yes. Title to the food is in P. What the customer pays for is a right to satisfy 
his appetite by the process of destruction. When he has done that he must stop. He 
may not turn over unconsumed portions to others, or carry away such portions. The 
customer pays for services and no title to any food passes except as an incident 
to its destruction by the consumption of the person ordering the item so consumed. 
Note: U.CoCe#2-314 which deals with the implied warranty of merchantability states 
~ "Under this section the sel'oo:ing for value of food or drink to be consumed 
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale." It is probable that this changes the 
law as first stated above which statement was a dictim only. Note, though, that the 
U .c.c. states "under this section"--not "under this Article". 
SALES (second case)CREDITORS RIGHTS ,fl.t,t)J< 5 d J nggested by 188 Va.214. 
X owned a restaurant. She sold it toy. No attempt was made to comply with the 
bulk sales law. X's trustee in ba1~rupt~y claims the sale to Y is .void as to X's 
creditors. Is this contention valid? 
No. The Bulk Sales Act(U .CoCo 6 ... 102 (3)) reads, 11 The enterprises subject to this 
Article are all those whose principal business is the sale of merchandise from 
stock, including those who manp.facture what they sell. 11 Comment 2 reads i.n part, 
"The businesses covered do not include farming nor contracting nor professional 
services, nor such things aa cleaning shops, barber ships, pool halls, hotels, 
restaurants, and the like whose principal business is the sale not of merchandise 
but of services •11 Note: The bulk sale of fixtures is within the bulk sales 1a-v1 
only if made in connection with a bulk sale of merchandise that is covered by 
Article VI of ~te u.c.c. 
SAlES ~fJ;J~ ...... ~ ,..~-c ~ ;;> 191 Va.525,566. 
P sued D for $66~,5'61 damages due "to defective paint. D vras a manufacturer of 
paint which P used for finishing redia cabi.nets. D expressly warranted that the 
paint would be uniform as to quality and ingredients. Does this negative the exist-
ence of an implied warranty of suite.bility? 
He]d: No. nWhen one contracts to supply an article in which he deals, to be 
applied to a particular purpose, so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judg-
ment or skill of the vendor, there is an implied vrarranty that it shall be reason-
ably fit for the purpose--"· The express warranty is not inconsistent with the 
implied one. Rather, ti•rhe two warranties were complementary rather than conflicting•; 
Note: Same result under u.c.c. 2-317. 
SALES Automobiles Title 193 Va.677. 
Seller"· sold Bu:·e.r a used car knowlng that Buyer expected to resell. The motor 
number on the engine did not corre3pond to that on the certificate of title. Held: 
Seller impliedly warranted the title, and until this matter is cleared up Buyer does 
not have a good title under statutes and latter can recover damages proximately re-
sulting from this lack of title. U.C.C.2-312 reads in part, ***there is in a con-
90). 
t:::act for sale a warranty by the seller that.(a) the title conveyed (1) shall be good, 
and its transfer rightful. 
) . 
SALES Sale on ipprov~l 193 Vao83le 
p sold D an a r con itioning unit on Sept.4,1948 on approval. No definltf3 tria.l 
time was stated. There was no more hot weather that year so P told D he could keep 
the unit until hot weather set in next year so he could give the unit a fair trial. 
During the winter D decided not to take the unit, but he did not tell P of this ds·· 
cision "because it was P's property and that was P's worry. 11 Finally on August 1, 
1949, P, not having had any word from D, demanded payment. Then P for the first tjne 
told D he was not going to take the unit and for P to come and get it. P sued D 
for the purchase price and the jury found for P. Should judgment be given for P. 
notwithstanding the verdict? 
Held: For P for two reasons:(l)After D had agreed to take on approval after a 
trial he had no right to refuse to allow a trial. By his own testimony D had decid-
ed not to take the unit in the winter before an adequate trial had been had. (2) A 
jury could hav~ found that D had had the unit a reasonable time in which to give it a 
trial and that he had failed to gj_ve notice of disapproval within a reasonable time 
thereafter thereby leading P to believe that he had approved. In such cases title 
passes, as any other rule would work an unreasonable hardship on the seller who has 
been deprived of the use of his property and a possible sale to others. 
(Same result under U.C.C o2 ... 327(b)(2) Which reads in part~ n~;HH~but failure seasonably 
to notify the seller of election to return the goods(sold on approval) is acceptance" 
And under u.c.c.2-709 the seller is entitled to the purchase price of goods that 
have been accepted. 
SALES .I{n~lied War.ranty 1~,tj- .~ M ,l.~~u~ted by 194 Va.623. 
D bough five pairs of ch~nch~llas from P for breclrin[{1>1rl·poses. If D told P that 
he knew nothing about chinchillas and asked P to select five pairs for him would ther' 
.... 
be an implied warranty that the chinchillas were not impotent? 
Yeo, if P held himself out expressly or impliedly as having special knowledge on 
the matter and knew that D wished tbem for breeding rather than for pelts. 
Suppose that in the above case P sued D for llao purchase price and D defendeded on 
the ground that there had been a breach of an oral express warranty, who should open 
and close on that point? 
D's defense would be in the nature of one by confession and avoidance. He is the 
one who says the warranty was made and broken. Hence he has the burden of proof on 
that point and should introduce his evidence first. 
SALES ·-r..A}J_ J,/n --~ r-f J:f,L s . 194 Va.976. 
D sofcFY~ prodd~~ le Re-Nu~nl ~}hi~ ~s advertised to seal, insulate, beautify 
and protect the surface o any house. "You Never Need Paint Againn. Some weeks 
after its application the house began to turn from an original white to a dark color, 
dampness and mold appeared on both the inside and the outside, and rotten places 
developed in some of the woodwork. 'rhere was evidence to indicate that the product 
stopped up the pores of the wood and interfered with its ttbreathingn, thereby causing 
dampness and r3to Is D liable for the damage done? 
Held: Yes. He impliedly warranted that ne-Nu-It was reasonably fit for the purpose 
intended. 
SALES ~ ;,L 'r~ 197 Va.255. 
R wasi6{the~hau~bu~·~ess. He ordered a tractor from G, and also a nfifth 
wheel" which is used to attach a trailer to the tractor. G selected and installed th1 
fifth wheel after having purchased it from H which in turn had purchased it from D, 
the manufacturer. G, without negligence, improperly installed the fifth wheel so 
that the mechanism locked when it was not properly attached thereby causing R reason-
ably to believe that everything was all right. As a result the trailer bec~ne de-
906o 
tached and it and its cargo were damaged. R sued G ~nd H. 
Heldf G is liable. G was acquainted with R•s business and knew the purpose f or 
which he wished the fifth wheel. There was an implied~warranty that the wheel as 
i.nstalled was suitable as R relied on G. Held also that H was not liable as there 
was no privity between H and R, no reliance by R on H, and no evidence of negligenc~ 
on the part of H who sold the wheel independently of the tractor. (McPherson v. 
Buick disti.nguished on the facts just stated.) --
~-z~ Under the U .c .c. there is an implied warranty of merchantability for usual 
purp~ses(#2-314) and an implied warranty for a particular purpose where such purpose 
is made known to the seller and the seller holds himself out as having special 
knowledge.(#2-315) Under U.C.C.#2-318(Virginia version) lack of privity is no longer 
a defense, but since H has not broken any warranty nor b~en negligent he is not 
liable. 
SALES Torts Conversion .(9-} A.Jo w~ fo /;t-- 198 Va.67 
B, a sailor, st ationed in Norfolk but whdse home was in Wyoming, purchased a car· 
on the conditional sales plan in Wyoming. The contract provided that B would not seJ 
or enctunber the car, and that on default the holder of the indebtodness could re-
possess. The conditional sale was properly recorded in Wyoming and entered on B's 
certificate of title. After B was in default he erased the entry on the certificate 
of title and sold the car to X who resold to Y. P, the finance company, to whom tho 
contract of conditional sale had been assigned, cla:l.med (1) that the lien of the 
indebtedness was sUll valid, and (2) that X was a converter. The trial court held 
that the lien was still valid, and that when X exorcised dominion over the car 0y 
selling it, he ne~essarily sold it subject to the lien, and hence was not a converter 
Held: The trial court was right as to the existence of the lien since the car had 
not gained a new situs in Virginia and the laws of Wyoming had been complied vdth, 
but wrong in holding that there was no conversion. X in selling the car exercised ar 
act of dominion over the car inconsistent with P's right to immediate possession. 
This was a conversion of P1s interest in the car regardless of X's good faith. 
SALES Contracts 198 Va.360 
P oont,:ac t ed to sell his drugstore to D who paid ~~100 do1m as a deposit, gave his 
note for ~P7 .000, and paid E ~~2900 to be held by E as an escrow agent for sixty days 
at the end of which time E was to pay off P's creditors unless P's landlord, L, had 
refused to accept D as his tenant in place of P. The lease between L and P expressl: 
provided that P could not assign the le2.se without L's consent. L refused to accept 
D as a tenant. The contract of sale between P and D vras conditioned on L's willing·· 
ness to accept D as a tenant. 'rhe trial judge ruled that the ~2900 placed in escrow 
should be used to pay P' s creditors, and that D's only remedy v-1as one against P for 
damages for breach of contract. 
Held: Error. If the buyer does not receive that which he has purchased he has 
alternative remedies at his option. He may bring the present equivalent of an 
action of asnumpsit to recover back what he has paid, or he may sue .for damages for 
breach of contract. So D is entitled to the return of his note, the $100 do1~ pay-
ment, and the $2900 placed in escrow for P's benefit. 
SALES Swift Y• Wells ttryr,.,t~~ r /) 201 Va,213. 
H and W were husband and wife. W purcnas~wift"s Premium Picnic Shoulder 
(smoked pork)from R's supermarket. It was wrapped in cellophane. She ate some of 
thepork which appeared to ba perfectly good and after she had cooked it properiy. 
As a result she had a very seve~e attack of food poisoning. The medical evidence 
indicated that enterotoxin had been produced in the pork by bacteria while it was 
still in the possession of Swift & Co., and that while proper cooking will destroy 
the bacteria it will not destroy the enterotoxin alrea.dy produced. There was no 
evidence of negligence on the part of S1-1ift & Co. The Court says, ttThe precise 
question whether a non-negligent manufacturBr of food, who supplies the same to a 
retailer for resale for human conaU!i1ption, is liable to th13 ultimate consumer for 
injuries sustained by him as a result of eating such food, shown to be unwholesome 
at the time it left the manufacturer's possession, has not heretofC>re-been presented 
---------
J.;c 'ti1Ls Court .• " (Underlining added) 
Held: s-~rift & Coo is liable on ~rounds of public policy despi.te the fact th::tt t,r, ~:-'1". 
HaG no privity. Swift & Co. are ~n the best position to prevent their produ~ t::: i'ro:·.l 
be~ng contaminated. There is an implied warranty of wholesomeness in favor of the 
ultimate consumer. Also V#J-303 and 3-308, expressly make it unlawful to ssll or 
expose for sale any ~P~unwholesome, or adulterated food for human use. 
Note: This case was decided before the passage of V#8-6.54.3(statut.e doing away with 
defe:nse la~k of privity now incorporated in the Virginia ye:csion of the UoC.C~ af-.l 
V#8 .2-318). This statute gives the plaintiff in Swift v. Wells an even st~onger cese 
than that which she won without the help of the statute. 
SALES Implied Warranty--Dama~es 202 Va.7CO 
Buyer was the irhlidh±se dea er of Seller in a certain part of Virginia for Cool 
Roof Products. Seller had improperly mixed some of his product, and as a result 
Buyer had to pay damages to some of his customers. Buyer, in order to pay his bills, 
was forced to sell his equity in some property for $5,000 less than it was worth. It 
appeared that Buyer knew as much about roofing materials as did Seller and that he 
did not rely on Seller's skill and judgment. . 
Held:(l) While there was no implied warran~y of fitness for a specific purpose be-
cause of no reliance on Seller: s skill and judgment., still, whereone buys a product 
under its trade name, the!'e is an implied w:).rra.nty of general merchantability or of 
fitness for the general purposes of goods so described. In the instant case there 
was a violation of such a w-a~:·ranty.{2) The price paid for the products was not a 
proper measure of damages since only a portion ful:te::-eof was defective. The damages 
should be the difference in value of the goods sold and their value if they had been 
as warranted. The damages resu.l ting from a for0ed sale of Bu~mr' s properties were 
too remote and not in the contemplation of the parties(in case of breach)at the time 
the contract was made. 
SALSS Sale on approval ~ ('A-< ~i.a--- 203 Va.1.52 
P, who was under contra~~to -build a highway, needed a stone crusher. He contracted 
to buy one from D. The contract provided for a five day trial period. D guaranteed~ 
"The overall cost will be less th.9.n 2.5¢ per ton." Both agreed that, "In the event 
the machine fills the above guarantee the customer is to buy the machine. In the 
event it does ·not meet the above guarantee then the customer has the option of re-
turning it to the factory at no cost to him other than one-way freight." P kept and 
paid for the machine after the trial period despite the fact that it cost 40¢ per 
ton to crush the rock. Both P and D knew that 100,000 t ons of crushed rock would be 
needed. The actual cost of crushing this rock was ~~96,000 instead of $2.5j)OOO. P sued 
D for the excess cost. The trial court held for :Po 
Held: Reversed. The 2.5¢ guarantee related to the trial period only. D could have 
returned the machine when tests in that period showed that the cost was excessive. 
In fact that was his only remedy. When he dacided to keep the machine despite the 
fact that it ~~uld not crush stone at a co~t of not over 25¢ per ton he waived any 
rights he might otherwise have h,:?.d on that!core. 
SALES J '- •.J,_J. . ..C (.. . --~.r /)~e..s. 205 Va • .579. 
p bo~~~a~r~tor ftbm D~w rrante hat . defeetive parts would be repaired or 
replaced without charge within c tain time and mileage limitations and it was agreed 
that p should have no other remedy for ~uch defects. P sued D for breach of warranty 
alleging and proving damages for loss of business while the tractor was being re-
paired in accordance with the warranty after defective parts broke. 
Held: He is not entitled to re~over consequential damages since the parties have 
agreed otherwise. Note: This decision is in accord with u.c.C.2-719 which rends in 
part 11 (a) the agreement ~1-:l-*may limit or alter the meafmre of damages recoverabl~HH~ 
as by lirni ting the buyer 1 s remedies·H*to repair and replacement of non-conforming 
goods or parts; and{b)resort to a ro.'l13dy pro•rided is optional unloss the remedy is 
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in whi ch case it is the sole remedy" and 11 (3) Con-
sequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is 
unconscionable. Li · rna es for in'ur to erson in the 
ease of consumer goods is prima facie unconsci.olnble __ bu J.imi.tat.ion of. damages :wh-ere 
the loss is cormnercjaJ (as in the case a~-i-8 not. 11 
908. 
SALES ~egli genqs Implied warrentieB-inLSale o~Used Cars 206 Vae307. 
P wished to buy a used , car. D told him to , try one oat. While P was driving the 
car on a trial run he had a flat and a blow 'Out. The latter caused the car to run 
off the road and P was injured. The evidence showed that the defects in the tires 
c.ould o·nly have been ascertained by highly scientific tests. These facts (made after 
the accident) did disclose the defects. P contended that D impliedly warranted tha~ 
the cars wore fit to drive and also that he was negligent in allowing c;lefective cars 
to be driven by possible purchasers. 
Held: For D. He was under no duty to employ ex ert scientists with ela ate 
te~hp~cal equipment to test the 1res on a used cars going through his hands. Nor 
are there any impli ed warranties of fitness or merchant abilitY- i the case of t he 
s~ e o use cars. Tho customer knows he is getting a used car, has full opportunit~ 
to i nspect same, and can insist on express warranties before buying. If there are 
no implied warranties in case of a sale, a fortiori there are none in the case of 
trial runs. 
Note: u.c.c.2-316(3)(c) roads, "An implied warranty can also be excluded or 
moa:rried by course of dealing or course of perfonnance or usage of trade.n 
SALES Imt lied War:mnty J "_J !Jf /?-1 !)' (~ ()~ J:xe ./1 .i: 206 Va.457. 
P bough a half of a sm~ham from the ·; SupormarRl f: ~ ham had been sold to 
D by H, a packer. After D received the ham he cut it in two, and wrapped each 
portion separately in cellophane. While P was eating a portion of the ham she bit 
into some buckshot thereby injuring ,her teeth. She sued D and H who contended they 
were not negligent and had broken no warranties, and even if they had, she was 
barred by her own contributory negligence. H also contended that it was not liable 
because the ham was not sold to P in :its original package. 
Holds Both defendants impliedly warranted that the ham was fit for human consump-
tion and free from harmful substances. p should have been given an opportunity to 
prove, if she could, that the harmful substance was imbedded in the ham when H sold 
it to D and likewise as to D when D sold to P. Such a warranty exists whether or 
not the ultimate purchaser buys the article in the original package. Lack of 
privity between P and H is no defense as VH8-654.3(and its successor Virginia 
U.C.Ce812~318) reads, "Lack of privity between the plaintiff and defendant shall be 
no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer or seller of goods to 
recover damages for breach of warranty express or implied, or for negligence althougt 
the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a 
person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use, 
consume or be affected by the goods . ~H*-*11 • 
The Supreme Court of Appeals also held that an action based on breach of an impliec 
warranty is primarily contractual in nature and hence that P's contributory negli-
gence, if any, 'WOuld not be a bar unless the defect was known, visible or olb'vl.ous 
to her in which oaae the presumption would be that the plaintiff contracted to buy 
this food in its obvious or known condition. 
. SALES--Damages £.et!-lr,~ b-- ~· ~9,4-A .. L2~~ c ~-- 206 Va.894. 
P bough t a new car from lf. . The car "~ ~ i~ Th~hop about one half of the time 
during a six-month period f'df the c~k'rection of defects. Finally P tendered the 
car to D and requested ~ ~~fund of bBe purchase price, contending that the car was 
not as warranted and was of no use to him. D refused to accept the car and P 
instituted an action against D for damages for breach of warranty. At the trial P 
introduced no evidence to show the difference in value of the car with the defects 
warranted against, and its value without defects, but contended that he should re-
cover the purchase price and the financing costs because the car w:1~ no good to him. 
Held: For D. P had a choice of remedies. He could have brought an action to 
rescind or one for money for breach of warranty, and he elected the latter. The 
two are mutually inconsistent. The rule is well established that the measure of 
damages for breach of warranty on the sale of personalty is the difference between 
the value of the article sold with the defect warranted against, and the value 
without the defect. The burden was on P to prove the damages with reasonable 
certainty. Damages cannot be based oh mere conjecture or speculation. A mere 
9tatement by P that the car was of no use to him, when it obviously had some value, 
does not meet the requirement of proof to a reasonable certainty. 
Note; The above case was decided under the old law of sales, since the transaction 
'Occurred prior to Jan. 1, 1966. 
If it were to be decided under the UCC we shou;J.d take into consideration the 
following: 
(t) The UCC does not use the term ••rescissiontt for reasons explained in Va. Code 
8.2-608 comment 1. 
(2) The UCC makes it clear that the buyer may accept goods with defects without, 
waiving his right to sue for damages for breach of warranty within reasonable time 
after he discovered or should have discovered the :·defects. (Va .. Code 8.2-607) 
If the seller attempts to corr~ct the defects and fails to do so, a reasonable 
time will be extended. Thus in the above case, one of the buyer's remedies would 
have been for him to have sued for damages for breach of warranty despite his 
acceptance. / 
(3) The UCC also gives another remedy, revocations of acceptance, which is 
wholly inconsistent with the remedy given above. 
Section2.-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part. 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-con-
formity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it 
has not been seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably 
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the 
seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer 
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial 
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is 
not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the 
goods involved as if he had rejected them. 
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P boughi rom IT automobi~ a~cy,vfor use as a family car, a demonstrator which 
had been driven 3600 miles. He received an express warranty against defect in 
material and workmanship under which D was bound. to repair or replace parts, which 
warranty also stated that there were no other warranties, express or impliedo Over 
the next few months, D made minor repairs to the car on several occasions. Five 
months after the sale, after having difficulty with the transmission, P returned the 
car to D and brought an action to rescind the sale and recover the purchase price on 
the theory that, despite the language of disclaimer in the express warranty, there 
was breach of an implied warranty of fitness. P also contended that, in any event, 
the exclusionary provisions of the express warranty were void for "overriding 
reasons of public policyn. 
Held: For D. Parties may, by mutual agreement, determine and fix the only warranties 
by which they are to be bound in the sale of automobiles. Such an agreement excludes 
existence of an implied warranty of fitness. P's contention that such an exclusion-
ary warranty is contrary to public policy is deprived of force by the fact that the 
legislature, in adopting the Uniform Commercial Code(after this case arose) specifi-
cally provided in Va.Code #8.2-316 how suoh an implied warranty of fitness attached 
to the sale of goods may be excluded. 
Note: Under present Virginia law, as set out in Va.Code #8.2-316, P would still be 
able to bring action under an implied v·11arranty of merchantability. To exclude 
such a warranty, the language must mention merchantability and in case of writing 
must be conspicuous. 
